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PLEA BARGAINING, SENTENCE MODIFICATIONS,
AND THE REAL WORLD
JulianA. Cook, III*

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in
the case of Freeman v. United States.1 Ignored largely, if not
entirely, by the greater media outlets, the little-noticed Freeman
decision is potentially more transformative than some of the Court's
higher-profiled Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions rendered in
recent years. 2 Specifically, Freeman addressed "whether defendants
who enter into plea agreements that recommend a particular
sentence as a condition of the guilty plea may be eligible for relief' if
the guideline range applicable to the underlying criminal offense
has subsequently been lowered. 3 In general, once a defendant is
4
sentenced, he is ineligible for later modification of that sentence.
5
However, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 sets forth certain exceptions to this rule.
One such exception is found in subsection (c)(2), which allows for
modification in instances where a defendant has been imprisoned
"based on" a federal sentencing guideline range that has since been
6
lowered.

* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
A.B. Duke University; M.P.A. Columbia University; J.D. University of Virginia.
I would like to thank Kent Barnett, Dan Coenen, Kim Forde-Mazrui, and Frank
Heft for their helpful comments during the preparation of this Article. I would
also like to thank University of Georgia School of Law students Jennifer Case,
Adrienne Moore, and Brendan White for their excellent research assistance.
1. 131 S.Ct. 2685 (2011).
2. See generally Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) (holding that an
inmate who was interrogated by law enforcement officers in a conference room
within a prison was not in custody for purposes of Miranda); United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (finding only that the placement of a GlobalPositioning-System device on a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information
constitutes a search); City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010)
(concluding that a government employer's search of an employee's governmentissued pager was reasonable).
3. Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2690.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) (2006); Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2696-97 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(c) MODIFICATION OF AN IMPOSED TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.-The court
may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed
except that-
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In 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission (the
"Commission") amended the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the
"Guidelines") in an effort to alleviate the longstanding and severe
penalty disparity between cocaine base ("crack cocaine") and cocaine
hydrochloride ("cocaine powder") trafficking offenses. 7 Sentencing

(2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant.., the court may
reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if
such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements
issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In addition, section 1B1.10 of the Guidelines
provides, in pertinent part:
Reduction in Term of Imprisonment as a Result of Amended Guideline
Range
(Policy Statement)
(a) Authority.(1) In General.-In a case in which a defendant is serving a term
of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that
defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an
amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed in subsection (c)
below, the court may reduce the defendant's term of
imprisonment as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). As required
by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), any such reduction in the defendant's
term of imprisonment shall be consistent with this policy
statement.
(b) Determination of Reduction in Term of Imprisonment.(1) In General.-In determining whether, and to what extent, a
reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement is warranted, the
court shall determine the amended guideline range that would
have been applicable to the defendant if the amendment(s) to the
guidelines listed in subsection (c) had been in effect at the time
the defendant was sentenced. In making such determination, the
court shall substitute only the amendments listed in subsection
(c) for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied
when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other
guideline application decisions unaffected.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10
7. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

(2011).
app. C, amend. 706. In 2010,

Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, which increased the minimum
quantities necessary to trigger minimum mandatory penalties for crack cocaine
trafficking offenses. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat.
2372 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Under the Act, a five-year
minimum sentence now requires twenty-eight grams (up from the previous five
grams), and a ten-year minimum now requires 280 grams (up from fifty grams).
Id. § 2. The Act also instructed the Commission to revise its guidelines "as the
Commission determines necessary to achieve consistency with other guideline
provisions and applicable law." Id. § 8(2). In response, the Commission issued
an emergency set of guideline revisions that became effective in November 2010

20131
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under the federal sentencing scheme requires a determination of a
particular crime's base offense level and an evaluation of a
Each category is assigned a
defendant's criminal history.8
particular score. In the context of narcotics trafficking crimes, the
corresponding base offense level is determined by the type and
weight of the drug involved. 9 Since the enactment of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986,10 which assigned minimum mandatory penalties
for certain narcotic offenses (including crimes involving crack
cocaine and cocaine powder), the Commission followed Congress's
lead and established guidelines that conformed with the Act. The
Commission equated trafficking crimes involving one gram of crack
cocaine with 100 grams of cocaine powder.11 This meant that an
individual who distributed a gram of crack cocaine would have had
to distribute 100 grams of cocaine powder to be assigned the same
base offense level.
After much debate and criticism, the Commission responded in
12
2007 by lessening the disparity between the two drugs.
Specifically, the Commission lowered by two levels the base offense
levels assigned to each crack cocaine quantity. 13 In 2008, the
Commission made the guideline amendments retroactive, thereby
permitting individuals previously sentenced under the old
Guidelines to seek a new sentence in accordance with the revised
14
sentencing table.
Whether Freeman's sentence was "based on" the Guidelines or
strictly upon the plea agreement was the central focus of the case.

and a permanent set of guidelines in November 2011. Neither the Fair
Sentencing Act nor the guideline revisions of 2010 or 2011 are relevant to this
discussion, but they are mentioned here in an attempt to provide a succinct
description of the most recent activities of Congress and the Commission in
regard to crack cocaine sentencing. See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683,
2688 (2010).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A.
9. Id. § 2D1.1(c).
10. Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207 (codified in scattered chapters of U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 35). Under
the Act, a five-year minimum mandatory penalty would attach to a first-time
offender whose trafficking offense involved a minimum of five grams of crack
cocaine. A ten-year minimum mandatory penalty would be triggered in the
event such an individual trafficked in at least fifty grams of crack cocaine. For
these same minimums to attach in the cocaine powder context, an offender
would have to traffic in a minimum of 500 grams (five-year minimum) and 5000
grams (ten-year minimum). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C,
amend. 706.
11. Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2688 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85, 96 (2007)).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C., amend. 706; see also
Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2688.
13. Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2688.
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C; amend. 713; see also
Dillon, 130 S.Ct. at 2688.
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Freeman argued the former position, contending that, since the
original guideline range applicable to his underlying narcotics
charge (possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine) of fortysix to fifty-seven months had been reduced to thirty-seven to fortysix months, he was eligible to seek a sentence reduction. 15 He
insisted that Congress intended for defendants in his position,
irrespective of the nature of the underlying plea agreement, to be
eligible for relief under the section. 16 Conversely, the government
insisted that sentences imposed pursuant to plea agreements that
bind the court to a specific sentence are based not upon a guideline
range but upon the agreement itself.17 The government maintained
that, in the binding plea context, the court is not considering a range
of sentences but instead is simply implementing the agreed upon
sentencing term contained in the agreement.' 8
In a five-to-four decision, the Court found for Freeman,
concluding that he was eligible to seek a sentence reduction. 19 And
while the end result certainly divided the Court and was no doubt
good news for Freeman, it was the concurring opinion of Justice
Sotomayor (who provided the critical fifth vote and a narrower basis
for her judgment) that was controlling and may ultimately prove to
be problematic for defendants and the Commission in years to come.
It is an opinion that straddles the fence between the competing
views of Justice Kennedy (joined by Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg),
who announced the judgment of the Court and expressed the view
that sentences imposed pursuant to binding agreements are always
eligible for later modifications, 20 and Chief Justice Roberts (joined
by Alito, Scalia, and Thomas), who, in dissent, opined that such
sentences fall outside the purview of § 3582.21 While concurring in
the result reached by Kennedy, Sotomayor agreed with much of the
reasoning penned by Roberts.
Sotomayor's break with the dissent was contractual in nature.
Though she agreed with Roberts that sentences imposed pursuant to
binding plea agreements do not constitute Guidelines sentences for
purposes of § 3582, she insisted that this is merely a general

15. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2691-92 (2011). Freeman
was sentenced to 106 months for possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
The guideline range referenced above was applicable to the narcotics charge.
He received an additional sixty months as a minimum mandatory sentence for
the firearm conviction, which was not at issue in Freeman. Id.
16. Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Freeman, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (No. 09-10245),
2010 WL 4954354, at *10-11.
17. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2693.
18. Id. at 2696 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 2690 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 2692-93.
21. Id. at 2701 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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principle that can be pierced by a plea agreement's plain language. 22
Thus, where the plea agreement expressly declares the oppositethat the binding sentence was the product of a guideline calculusthen this language trumps the general rule and allows for § 3582
relief. 23 And since Freeman's plea agreement reflected that the
Guidelines were considered, Sotomayor concluded that he was
eligible for relief under the section. 24 Sotomayor also issued a
statement, in dicta, that, if acted upon, could produce unfortunate,
long-term ramifications for criminal defendants generally and for
the Commission and its efforts at rectifying sentencing inequities.
For prosecutors interested in bypassing such an outcome in future
cases, Sotomayor flagged a remedy: incorporate language in the plea
agreement that expressly declares that the defendant agrees to
25
waive his right to seek further sentence reductions.
The primary purposes underlying this Article are twofold.
First, it will explain why the Freeman Court, despite reaching the
correct end result, erred in its analytical approach. In so doing, the
Article will illuminate the real world of plea bargaining in the
Freeman context and explain why this plea negotiation truism
provides a sounder, firmer, and clearer foundation to decide not only
Freeman-type cases but any such case seeking § 3582 relief. In
addition, this Article will use the Freeman decision to highlight and
correct a common misunderstanding about the nature of plea
agreement contracts. It will describe how plea agreement contracts
have traditionally-and erroneously-been construed by the courts
and others as unilateral arrangements between the prosecution and
the defendant. As will be explained, however, plea agreements
should properly be construed as bilateral contracts involving three
parties-the prosecution, the defendant, and the court. And when
viewed in this light, the appropriate resolution in Freeman and
other cases involving § 3582 relief becomes clearer.
Second, this Article will focus upon Sotomayor's seemingly
innocent suggestion, in dicta, that prosecutors can preempt future §
3582 petitions through the inclusion of waiver clauses.
The
significance of her statement should not be casually dismissed or
overlooked. This Article will explain why waivers of this type are
likely to be considered constitutionally legitimate and why, if
formally adopted by the Department of Justice, the standard
inclusion of § 3582 waivers in plea agreements will not only serve to
undercut defendant interests generally but will also considerably
undermine the effectiveness of the Guidelines. In proving this latter
point, the Article will counter Kennedy's declaration regarding the
supposed infrequency of retroactive amendments with historical
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2695-98 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
2697-98.
2699-2700.
2699.
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references to the Commission's numerous efforts at successful
guideline reform that produced more fair and equitable sentencing
outcomes.
Part I of this Article will provide a foundational review.
Specifically, it will review the underlying facts in Freeman as well as
the three opinions authored by Justice Kennedy, Justice Sotomayor,
and Chief Justice Roberts, respectively. Part II will discuss the real
world of plea bargaining in the context presented in Freeman, as
well as the contractual argument outlined above. Finally, Part III
will examine Justice Sotomayor's suggestion in dicta regarding the
inclusion of § 3582 waiver provisions and the adverse ramifications
that would necessarily follow in the event of widespread adoption of
such a policy at the federal level.
I. FOUNDATIONAL BACKGROUND

Freeman v. United States: FactualOverview
On April 18, 2005, William Freeman entered a guilty plea to the
indictment returned in his case charging him with, inter alia,
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 26 He entered a
binding guilty plea (sometimes referred to as a "type C" plea)
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part:

A.

(c) PLEA AGREEMENT PROCEDURE.

(1) In General. An attorney for the government and the
defendant's attorney, or the defendant when proceeding pro se,
may discuss and reach a plea agreement.... If the defendant
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to either a charged offense or
a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may specify
that an attorney for the government will:

(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the
appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a
recommendation or request2 7binds the court once the court
accepts the plea agreement).
28 Sixty of
The specific sentence agreed upon was 106 months.
the months came by virtue of a mandatory minimum sentence
26. See generally, Court Order for Change of Plea, United States v.

Freeman, No. 3:04CR00098 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18, 2005).
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
28. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2691.
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attributable to Freeman's guilty plea to the charge of possession of a
29
The
firearm during and in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.
plea to that charge was not the subject of Freeman's appeal. The
remaining forty-six months were attributable to the charge that was
the subject of his appeal-his guilty plea to the aforementioned
crack cocaine offense. 30 The plea agreement stated that it was the
expectation of the parties that, for the narcotics offense, Freeman
had a guideline range of forty-six to fifty-seven months based upon a
base offense level of nineteen and Category IV criminal history
plea
category. 31 The district court accepted the proposed binding
32
term.
106-month
the
to
agreement and sentenced Freeman
The guideline range attributable to the crack cocaine offense
was modified by the Commission three years after Freeman's guilty
plea. 33 As a result, the range applicable to Freeman's offense was
lowered from forty-six to fifty-seven months to thirty-seven to fortysix months.34 Freeman, in turn, moved for a sentence modification
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 35 The district court denied36 Freeman's
request, and this result was upheld by the Sixth Circuit.
B.

Freeman v. United States: The Supreme Court's Decision
1.

The Opinion of Justice Kennedy

By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit's decision. Justice Kennedy, who announced the Court's
judgment and wrote on behalf of Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Breyer, concluded "that the district court has authority to entertain
§ 3582(c)(2) motions when sentences are imposed in light of the
Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into [a type C]
agreement." 37 In support, he cited federal statutory law that
mandates, without limiting language as to plea type, that a court
consider the Guidelines, among other factors, when imposing a
39
sentence. 38 He added, inter alia, that the commentary to section

29. Id.
30. Id. at 2699-2700 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 2699.
32.

Id. at 2691 (plurality opinion).

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2692.

36. Id.
37. Id. at 2688.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
39. The commentary to section 6B1.2 of the Guidelines
pertinent part:
Similarly, the court should accept a recommended sentence
agreement requiring imposition of a specific sentence only if
is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate
within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that the

provides, in
or a plea
the court
sentence
sentence
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6B1.240 of the Guidelines requires that district courts "give due
consideration to the relevant sentencing range, even if the
defendant and prosecutor recommend a specific sentence as a
4
condition of the guilty plea." 1

Kennedy then referenced Freeman's sentencing hearing,
declaring that it also revealed that the Guidelines underlay the
court's sentence. 42 He noted that the court had "calculated the
sentencing range" and had "explained that it 'considered the
advisory Guidelines and 18 USC 3553(a)[sic],' and that 'the sentence

imposed. . . fall[s] within the guideline rang[e] and [is] sufficient to
meet the objectives of the law."' 43

Kennedy added that any concerns attendant to granting district
courts the authority to impose sentences in the circumstances
presented in Freeman are "overstated."44 Citing a 2009 Tulsa Law
Review article, he claimed that the issue presented will rarely arise
given the infrequent occurrence of retroactive
guideline
amendments. 45 Moreover, he added, § 3582 imposes meaningful
restrictions upon a district court. He noted that the statute does not
mandate that a district court impose a reduced sentence merely
because the applicable guideline range has been modified:
If the district court, based on its experience and informed
judgment, concludes the agreement led to a more lenient
sentence than would otherwise have been imposed, it can deny
the motion, for the statute permits but does not require the
court to reduce a sentence. This discretion ensures that §
3582(c)(2) does not produce a windfall. 46

departs from

the

applicable guideline

reasons ....

range

for justifiable

§ 6B1.2 (2010).
40. Section 6B1.2(c) of the Guidelines provides:
In the case of a plea agreement that includes a specific sentence (Rule
11(c)(1)(C)), the court may accept the agreement if the court is
satisfied either that:
(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range;
or
(2) (A) the agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline
range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons are
specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons or
iudgment and commitment order.
Id. § 6B1.2(c).
41. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2692.
42. Id. at 2693.
43. Id. (alteration in original).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Susan R. Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ's Attack on
Federal Judiciary 'Leniency," the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of
CriminalSentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 535 (2009)).
46. Id. at 2694.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
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Kennedy noted, however, that, should the court elect to lower a
sentence, it may alter only the guideline determination affected by
the Commission's amendment.4 7 No other preamendment guideline
conclusion may be revisited.
And even a district court's
resentencing determination is subject to appellate review.
Finally, Kennedy briefly addressed Sotomayor's concurrence.
Describing it as an "intermediate position," he noted her view that §
3582 relief should generally be unavailable to defendants who are
sentenced pursuant to binding plea agreements, unless the verbiage
within the plea agreement indicates that the Guidelines were
considered. 48 Kennedy countered, however, that § 3582 requires an
inquiry not into the reasons that motivated the plea agreement but
49
into the reasons underlying the court's sentence.
He further noted the "significant" consequences attendant to
Sotomayor's approach. 50 Arguing that the underlying aim of the
Guidelines to reduce sentencing disparities would be undercut,
Kennedy stated:
The Act aims to create a comprehensive sentencing scheme in
which those who commit crimes of similar severity under
similar conditions receive similar sentences.
Section
3582(c)(2) contributes to that goal by ensuring that district
courts may adjust sentences imposed pursuant to a range that
the Commission concludes are too severe, out of step with the
seriousness of the crime and the sentencing ranges of
analogous offenses, and inconsistent with the Act's purposes.
The crack-cocaine range here is a prime example of an
unwarranted disparity that § 3582(c)(2) is designed to cure.
The Commission amended the crack-cocaine Guidelines to
effect a "partial remedy" for the "urgent and compelling"
problem of crack-cocaine sentences, which, the Commission
concluded, "significantly undermines the various congressional
objectives set forth in the Sentencing Reform Act." The
Commission determined that those Guidelines were flawed,
and therefore that sentences that relied on them ought to be
reexamined. There is no good reason to extend the benefit of
the Commission's judgment only to an arbitrary subset of
defendants whose agreed sentences were accepted in light of a
since-rejected Guidelines range based on whether their plea
agreements refer to the Guidelines. Congress enacted §
3582(c)(2) to remedy systemic injustice, and the approach

47. If the original sentence was a downward departure, a district court is
allowed greater flexibility in sentencing under § 3582.
48. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2694.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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outlined in the opinion concurring in the judgment would
51
undercut a systemic solution.
2.

The Concurrenceof Justice Sotomayor
As noted, Justice Sotomayor concurred in the result but
digressed with respect to the underlying rationale.
Since her
opinion provided the narrowest basis upon which the plurality of
Justices could agree, her concurrence is controlling.
She agreed with the dissent that, in general, sentences imposed
pursuant to binding plea agreements are based not upon the
Guidelines but upon the agreement.5 2 However, she concluded "that
if a (C) agreement expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range
applicable to the charged offense to establish the term of
imprisonment," then a defendant can avail himself of § 3582(c)(2)
relief in the event that range is subsequently modified by the
Commission. 53 Such a sentence, according to Sotomayor, is "based
54
on" the guideline range.
She reasoned that with type C agreements, a court is not
undertaking an "independent calculation of the Guidelines or
consideration of the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors." 55 Instead,
the court must decide simply whether or not to accept the proposed
plea agreement and its accompanying sentencing term. 56 Thus, the
"foundation" for the sentence is the agreement itself.
She
acknowledged that courts ordinarily enjoy significant discretion
when imposing a sentence. 57 However, in the context of binding
pleas, it is the sentencing term within the accepted plea agreement
that determines the sentence. Sotomayor added that to allow § 3582
relief in this context simply because a district court considered the
Guidelines when determining whether to accept the binding plea
proposal would enable courts to "rewrite" type C agreements in ways
not contemplated by the litigants. 58
Sotomayor also rejected the argument that the litigants'
contemplation of the Guidelines during their negotiations enables a
court to later reduce an agreed-upon sentence. 59 She maintained
that the underlying negotiations are not determinative of whether a
sentence is based upon the Guidelines. 60

51. Id. at 2694-95 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2696.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2697.
60. Id. ("I ...cannot agree... that § 3582(c)(2) calls upon district courts to
engage in a free-ranging search through the parties' negotiating history in
search of a Guidelines sentencing range that might have been relevant to the

2013]

PLEA BARGAINING

Yet, Sotomayor concluded that Freeman was entitled to relief
given that the plain language of his plea agreement stated that the
Guidelines were considered. 61 She declared that when a plea
agreement expressly states that the Guidelines provided the basis
for the agreed-upon term then a court's acceptance of that term
renders the sentence one that is "based on" the Guidelines. 62 In
reaching this conclusion, she added that she necessarily "reject[s]
the categorical rule advanced by the Government and endorsed by
the dissent" that prohibits defendants sentenced pursuant to type C
agreements from availing themselves of a § 3582 remedy. 63 She
responded that type C agreements are designed to effectuate the
intent of the parties in regards to sentencing. 64 The y efore, when the
agreement reflects the parties' employment of the Guidelines, a
defendant may pursue modification pursuant to § 3582.65
Sotomayor also submitted that this result does not deprive the
government of the benefit of the bargain it negotiated with the
defendant. 66 She reiterated that the agreement itself reflects the
intent of the parties, and when that agreement reflects that the
Guidelines formed the basis for the agreed upon sentencing term,
allowing relief pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) does not "result in certain
defendants receiving an 'unjustified windfall."' 67 She explained,
however, that prosecutors interested in foreclosing the possibility of
defendants availing themselves of § 3582 relief could easily do so
through the inclusion of waiver language in the plea agreement:

agreement or the court's acceptance of it. Nor can I agree with the plurality
that the district judge's calculation of the Guidelines provides the basis for the
term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement.").
61. Id. at 2699-2700 ("The agreement states that Freeman 'agrees to have
his sentence determined pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines,' and that 106
months is the total term of imprisonment to be imposed. The agreement also
makes clear that the § 924(c)(1)(A) count to which Freeman agrees to plead
guilty carries a minimum sentence of 60 months, 'which must be served
This leaves 46 months
consecutively to' any other sentence imposed.
The agreement sets Freeman's offense level at 19, as
unaccounted for.
determined by the quantity of drugs and his acceptance of responsibility, and
states that the parties anticipate a criminal history category of IV. Looking to
the Sentencing Guidelines, an offense level of 19 and a criminal history
category of IV produce a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months. Therefore,
contrary to the dissent's curious suggestion that 'there is no way of knowing
what th[e] sentence was "based on,"' it is evident that Freeman's agreement
employed the 46-month figure at the bottom end of this sentencing range, in
combination with the 60-month mandatory minimum sentence under §
924(c)(1)(A), to establish his 106-month sentence." (citations omitted)).
62. Id. at 2700.

63. Id. at 2698.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 2698-99.
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Finally, if the Government wants to ensure ex ante that a
particular defendant's term of imprisonment will not be
reduced later, the solution is simple enough: Nothing prevents
the Government from negotiating with a defendant to secure a
waiver of his statutory right to seek sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(2), just as it often does with respect to a defendant's
rights to appeal and collaterally attack the conviction and
sentence. In short, application of § 3582(c)(2) to an eligible
defendant does not-and will not-deprive the Government of
68
the benefit of its bargain.
3.

The Dissent of Chief Justice Roberts

In dissent, Roberts stated that he agreed with Sotomayor that
sentences imposed pursuant to type C agreements are based not
upon the Guidelines but upon the agreement. 69 He further agreed
with Sotomayor that the court's consideration of the Guidelines in
determining whether to accept the agreement does nothing to alter
this conclusion.7 0 A different result, Roberts submitted, would
enable district courts to restructure binding plea agreements in
ways unforeseen by the litigants.7 1
He disagreed, however, with Sotomayor's contention that a
defendant may avail himself of a § 3582 remedy in instances where
a plea agreement reflects the parties' consideration of the
Guidelines. 7 2
He described as "head-scratching" Sotomayor's
distinction between evidence suggesting that the parties considered
the Guidelines during their plea negotiations-which, according to
her, would not permit § 3582 relief-and instances where "the
agreement sets forth a specific term but it is somehow 'clear that the
basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range"'which, according to her, would permit § 3582 relief.73 Roberts
argued that this constitutes a test that is "unworkable" and will lead
74
to "arbitrary results."
Roberts stated that this "confusion is compounded" given the
different analytical tests employed by Sotomayor.7 5 He noted that
Sotomayor had variously described the standard as whether the
Guidelines were "expressly" employed by the agreement, were
"evident" from the agreement, or "whether the agreement

68. Id. at 2699 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 2700-01 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (writing that, at the moment
of sentencing, the "District Court needed to consult one thing and one thing
only-the plea agreement").
70. Id. at 2701.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2702.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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'indicate[s]the parties' intent to base the term of imprisonment on a
76
particular Guideline range."'

He further argued that the first and second halves of the
concurrence suffered from a shift in analytical focus. 77

Roberts

noted that Sotomayor's opinion initially restricted itself to a review
of the judge's conduct. 78 He stated that when a court accepts the
plea agreement, "the judge considers only the fixed term in the
agreement, so the sentence he actually imposes is not 'based on' the
Guidelines." 79 The opinion's second half, according to Roberts,
shifted its analytical focus to the litigating parties and the possible
role the Guidelines played in their underlying negotiations.80 This
was improper, Roberts submitted, because § 3582(c)(2) is a
sentencing provision, and "[o]nly a court can sentence a
Accordingly, whether the parties contemplated the
defendant."8'
Guidelines in arriving at the binding sentencing term is irrelevant
82
to this analysis.
His conclusion that sentences imposed pursuant to binding plea
agreements do not constitute guideline sentences for purposes of §
3582 is, according to Roberts, buttressed by section 1B1.10(b)(1) of
the Guidelines. He explained:
[Section] 3582(c)(2) requires a district court "to follow the
Commission's instructions in § 1B1.10 to determine the
prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification." According to
§ 1B1.10(b)(1), the court must first determine "the amended
guideline range that would have been applicable to the
defendant" if the retroactively amended provision had been in
"In making such
effect at the time of his sentencing.
determination, the court shall substitute only the
amendments... for the corresponding guideline provisions
that were applied when the defendant was sentenced."

As noted, the District Court sentenced Freeman pursuant to
the term specified by his plea agreement; it never "applied" a
Guidelines provision in imposing his term of imprisonment.
The fact that the court may have "use[d] the Guidelines as a
yardstick in deciding whether to accept a (C) agreement does
not mean that the term of imprisonment imposed by the court
is 'based on' a particular Guidelines sentencing range."8 3

76. Id. (alteration in original).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2702-03 (citations omitted).
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Roberts further argued that there is nothing in Freeman's plea
agreement to suggest that the parties contemplated a possible
sentencing reduction pursuant to § 3582.84 He submitted that "it is
fanciful to suppose that the parties would have said '106 months' if
what they really meant was 'a sentence at the lowest end of the
applicable Guidelines range."'8 5 Roberts claimed that in the binding

plea context it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the precise
basis for the agreed upon fixed term.8 6 He posited, inter alia, that
resource allocation assessments, witness credibility concerns, and
conceivably
uncertainty as to the applicable guideline range could
87
term.
specified
a
to
agree
to
decision
underlie a party's
II. ANALYSIS OF THE FREEMAN OPINIONS
At its core, the ruling in Freeman is one about statutory
interpretation. At issue was whether a sentence that emanated
from a type C plea agreement was "based on" (as the term is used in
§ 3582(c)(2)) the applicable guideline range or on the plea
agreement. If the former, then a § 3582(c)(2) remedy could be
pursued.8 8 If the latter, then a § 3582(c)(2) remedy would be
89
unavailable.
I agree with Kennedy that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. §
3553 and section 6B1.2(c) of the Guidelines, the references made by
the district court to the Guidelines during the imposition of
Freeman's sentence, and the fairness objectives underlying the
Commission's amendment of the Guidelines are meaningful
indicators that the sentence imposed in Freeman was "based on" the
Guidelines. 90 It is difficult to ignore the mandates contained in §
3553 and section 6B1.2(c) that instruct district courts to consider the
Guidelines when imposing a sentence. Nowhere do these sections
except sentences that stem from binding pleas from this
requirement. In fact, the commentary to section 6B1.2 plainly
instructs courts to consider the Guidelines in the type C plea
context. 91 And the sentencing transcript in Freeman reveals that
the court did just that. 92 Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that
the Commission, when amending the guideline ranges applicable to
crack cocaine offenses, intended to differentiate between those
offenders based upon the type of plea agreement that was tendered.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

2703.

2691 (plurality opinion).
2701 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2692-95 (plurality opinion).

91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

92. Freeman, 131 S.Ct. at 2691.

§ 6B1.2 cmt. (2011).
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Based upon the foregoing, it is more than plausible to conclude
that an individual in Freeman's position should be permitted to
Yet, the opposite
avail himself of a § 3582(c)(2) remedy.
court is basing its
a
context,
C
plea
conclusion-that, in the type
sentence not upon a range of eligible sentencing options delineated
in the Guidelines but upon, and only upon, the single numerical
figure contained in the plea agreement-is another equally plausible
outcome.
In the end, the conclusions reached in all three Freeman
opinions were guided primarily by different definitional approaches
to the plain meaning of the statutory text rather than by controlling
legal principles and precedents. How to interpret the term "based
on" and how to apply it in the Freeman context ultimately depended
upon whether the Justices decided to construe the term narrowly or
broadly. The Court's broad constructionists concluded that "based
on" encompassed a court's activities pursuant to § 3553 and section
6B1.2(c). 93 Thus, a court that accepted a binding plea agreement
and factored the Guidelines as part of its decision-making calculus
necessarily based its sentence upon the Guidelines. 94 The Court's
strict constructionists, however, rejected this view. From their
perspective, sentences that stem from type C plea agreements are
95
usually, if not categorically, beyond the realm of § 3582(c)(2).
Thus, a court's consideration of the Guidelines, even if performed in
strict accordance with § 3553 and section 6B1.2(c), is generally, if
not entirely, an irrelevant inquiry. 96 Instead, they submitted, the
focus is largely, if not always, singular-upon the plea agreement
97
itself.
93. Id. at 2695.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2700 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2701.
97. Id. at 2695-96 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("To ask whether a
particular term of imprisonment is 'based on' a Guidelines sentencing range is
to ask whether that range serves as the basis or foundation for the term of
imprisonment.... As a result, in applying § 3582(c)(2) a court must discern
the foundation for the term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge.
As the plurality explains, in the normal course the district judge's calculation of
the Guidelines range applicable to the charged offenses will serve as the basis
for the term of imprisonment imposed. Sentencing under (C) agreements,
however, is different. At the time of sentencing, the term of imprisonment
imposed pursuant to a (C) agreement does not involve the court's independent
calculation of the Guidelines or consideration of the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors. The court may only accept or reject the agreement, and if it chooses to
accept it, at sentencing the court may only impose the term of imprisonment the
agreement calls for; the court may not change its terms. In the (C) agreement
context, therefore, it is the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for
the term of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced. At the moment
of sentencing, the court simply implements the terms of the agreement it has
already accepted. Contrary to the plurality's view, the fact that USSG [sic] §
6B1.2(c) ...instructs a district court to use the Guidelines as a yardstick in
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No doubt, statutory interpretation must often occur in a
vacuum.
The absence of governing interpretative standards
characterizes many attempts at statutory interpretation in criminal
and noncriminal contexts. However, such was not the case in
Freeman. As detailed below, the realities that underlie plea
bargaining in the context presented in Freeman and the proper
application of contractual law principles would have yielded a clear,
legitimate, and authoritative basis upon which to resolve the issue
presented.
A.

The Real World of Plea Bargaining
As noted, Chief Justice Roberts stated that "it is fanciful to
suppose that the parties would have said '106 months' if what they
really meant was 'a sentence at the lowest end of the applicable
Guidelines range."'9 8

Yet, the realities that characterize

plea

negotiations in Freeman-type contexts strongly suggest such an
interpretation-namely, that the 106-month term should not be
construed literally but should be interpreted to mean the low end of
the applicable guideline range.
In any case where a pretrial settlement is successfully
negotiated, the defense attorney must invariably confront and
overcome certain impediments. The many obstacles that potentially
impede successful negotiations include the stigma associated with a
conviction, client distrust, length of potential imprisonment,
noncollateral and collateral consequences associated with pleading
guilty, and views of family members. These risks become all the
more real in the context of felony offenses and are particularly acute
in narcotics trafficking and firearms cases that carry significant
terms of imprisonment.
Minimum mandatory sentences often characterize convictions
for narcotic and firearm offenses, and these statutory minimums
often double for defendants who have certain criminal histories. 99
Thus, it is hardly unusual for a defendant charged with offenses of
this type to be confronted with five-, ten-, or twenty-year minimum
mandatory sentences.10 0 Even the Supreme Court's decision in
deciding whether to accept a (C) agreement does not mean that the
term of imprisonment imposed by the court is 'based on' a particular Guidelines
sentencing range. The term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing judge
is dictated by the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties, not the

judge's Guidelines calculation. In short, the term of imprisonment imposed
pursuant to a (C) agreement is, for purposes of § 3582(c)(2), 'based on' the
agreement itself." (citations omitted)).
98. Id. at 2703 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
99. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)-(b), 924(c)(1)(A), (e)(1) (2006).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 436 F. App'x 518, 532-33 (6th Cir.
2011) (applying a five-year mandatory sentence for possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense); United States v. Nelson, 484 F.3d
257, 258 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying a ten-year mandatory sentence for narcotics
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United States v. Booker,10 1 which declared the mandatory
application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional, has done little
to assuage the concerns of defendants in such predicaments. 102
Courts are still bound to consider the Guidelines when imposing a
sentence and, more often than not, impose sentences within the
103
recommended ranges.
Typically, defendants have little leverage to negotiate
meaningful concessions from the government, which, more often
than not, has significant trial and resource advantages. And the
government, bound by mandatory minimums and guideline ranges,
is often constricted in its ability to circumvent the severe penalties
that accompany certain crimes. With little room to maneuver, many
defendants are reluctant to forgo their right to a jury trial.
One of the few reasonably attractive carrots that can be offered
to a defendant in such circumstances is the binding plea agreement.
Such an agreement, if accepted by the court, guarantees the
defendant the sentence specified in the document. Thus, if the court
accepts the agreement, the defendant has the peace of mind of
knowing with certainty his sentencing term. Conversely, should the
court decline to accept the agreement, the defendant is free to
104
withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial.
This, of course, was the option agreed to by Freeman and
ultimately proffered by the prosecution and defense to the court
(which accepted the agreement). Despite the fixed term, however,
the selling point of a type C agreement in this context is, except in
the most unusual of circumstances, not the numerical figure
delineated in the agreement but the low end of the applicable
guideline range. In Freeman, that guideline figure was forty-six

possession with intent to distribute based on defendant's prior felony drug

offense); United States v. Byrd, 208 F. App'x 216, 217-18 (4th Cir. 2006)
(applying a ten-year mandatory sentence for discharging a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime); United States v. Gargano, 144 F. App'x
905, 906 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence
to a narcotics violation based on the defendant's earlier felony drug conviction);
United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding to
impose a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant guilty of
two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence based on his two
previous felony convictions); United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 840 (9th
Cir. 1988) (upholding a five-year mandatory sentence for the defendant's
conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and attempt to
distribute).
101. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
102. Id. at 250.
103. Id. at 245; Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and
Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 22 (2007); Victoria A. Roberts,
Federal Sentencing Post-Booker, 86 MICH. B. J. 30, 32 (2007).
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5).
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months. 105 This was based upon a projected applicable base offense
06
level of nineteen and a criminal history category of IV.1
Often, the government and the defense attorney correctly
estimate the base offense level and criminal history categories.
Sometimes they do not. If, for example, the district court during
Freeman's sentencing hearing had determined that Freeman's
criminal history came to a level III as opposed to IV, his guideline
range would have been thirty-seven to forty-six months
(coincidently, the same guideline range applicable to Freeman after
the 2007 amendments to the Guidelines). 0 7 If, after the acceptance
of Freeman's plea, the court at sentencing reached such a
conclusion, it could not be credibly argued that it was the parties'
intent that Freeman be sentenced at the high-end of the applicable
range (forty-six months). 10 8 It would be foolhardy to suggest that
someone in Freeman's position intended to agree to a binding
sentence that would reach the maximum of the new guideline range.
Indeed, the goal of all the parties was to provide Freeman with the
lowest possible sentence, considering mandatory minimums and the
range of sentences under the Guidelines. A binding sentence at the
lowest end of whatever the applicable guideline range constituted
the most efficient way to dispose of the case pretrial. And, perhaps,
it may have been the only way. The government would get a
conviction with a meaningful term of imprisonment; the defendant
would have certainty that his prison exposure would be kept at a
minimum; and the court, like the other parties, would avoid the time
associated with trying the case. 109
It is undeniable that circumstances may arise where the fixed
Obviously, had Freeman's
term should be construed literally.
agreement included a numerical figure well above or below the
applicable range, it might be difficult to argue persuasively that the
In such
Guidelines formed a basis for the proposed term.
circumstances, relief pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) should probably be
precluded. But this was not the circumstance in Freeman where the
evidence clearly suggested that the 106-month term was the product
of a nonnegotiable sixty-month mandatory minimum and a forty-sixmonth term, which equated directly with the lowest possible
sentence of the guideline range anticipated by all the parties. 10
In situations where the binding sentencing term falls within the
applicable guideline range, a presumption that the sentence was

105. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2691 (2011).
106. Id.
107. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2005).
108. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2691.
109. This Article will explain later in this Subpart why there are three
parties (as opposed to two) to a plea agreement contract-the prosecution, the
defendant, and the court. See infra Part II.C.
110. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2691.

2013]

PLEA BARGAINING

based upon the Guidelines should be assumed by the courts. This
presumption is a natural consequence of the realities of plea
bargaining that underlie the Freeman context and analogous
circumstances. In situations where the binding term falls outside
the applicable range, no presumption should apply, and the court
should proceed to decide the case based upon the intent of the
parties. Ascertaining the intent of the parties in Freeman and nonFreeman contexts is an essential precondition to deciding any such
cases. Thus, irrespective of whether a particular case triggers the
presumption, it is vital that the court ascertain the intent of the
parties. Typically, this intent can be discerned through a review of
the plea agreement contract. However, as the following Subpart
explains, proper understanding of contractual law in the plea
agreement context is an essential prerequisite.
B.

ContractualAnalysis
As noted, in her controlling opinion, Justice Sotomayor
concluded that sentences that stem from a binding plea agreement
are based not upon the Guidelines but upon the agreement itself,
unless the terms of the plea agreement make a contrary
indication.1 1 1
Since Freeman's agreement reflected that the
government and the defendant considered the Guidelines in
formulating the agreed-upon sentence, Sotomayor found that he was
entitled to relief under the statute.
Kennedy and Roberts agreed that Sotomayor's focus upon the
verbiage in the plea agreement was misplaced. Kennedy wrote:
As noted, the opinion concurring in the judgment suggests an
intermediate position. That opinion argues that in general
defendants sentenced following 11(c)(1)(C) agreements are
ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief, but relief may be sought where
the plea agreement itself contemplates sentence reduction.
The statute, however, calls for an inquiry into the reasons for a
judge's sentence, not the reasons that motivated or informed
112
the parties.
Similarly, Roberts commented:
The error in the concurring opinion is largely attributable to a
mistaken shift in analysis. In the first half of the opinion, the
inquiry properly looks to what the judge does: He is, after all,
the one who imposes the sentence. After approving the
agreement, the judge considers only the fixed term in the
agreement, so the sentence he actually imposes is not "based
on" the Guidelines.

111. Id. at 2695 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2694 (plurality opinion).
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In the second half of the opinion, however, the analysis
suddenly shifts, and focuses on the parties: Did they "use" or
"employ" the Guidelines in arriving at the term in their
agreement? But § 3582(c)(2) is concerned only with whether a
defendant "has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range." Only a court can sentence a
defendant, so there is no basis for examining why the parties
113
settled on a particular prison term.
Given Sotomayor's supposition that only two parties-the
prosecution and defense-are parties to a plea agreement contract,
Kennedy and Roberts are correct in their assessment.1 4 The plea
agreement verbiage would necessarily reflect the intent of the
parties who brokered the agreement. And if the court is not a party
to the agreement and § 3582(c)(2) is concerned with the conduct of
the sentencing court (as opposed to the litigants), the criticism
leveled by Kennedy and Roberts would appear to be just.
Despite this analytical misstep, Sotomayor was nevertheless
correct to focus upon the plain language in the plea agreement. This
will become evident in the following Subpart, which will dispel a
common myth regarding plea agreement contracts, supplant it with
a new interpretation, and, in the process, explain why it is
appropriate to rely upon the text of a plea agreement in this context.
C.

Plea Agreement Contracts-GeneralPrinciples

The predominant-and
mistaken-construction
of plea
agreements is that they are unilateral contracts between the
prosecution and the defendant, with acceptance occurring only when

113. Id. at 2702 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114. Sotomayor's belief in a two-party agreement is evident from the
following passage from her concurrence.
Specifically, she submits that
sentences that stem from binding plea agreements generally should not be
construed as Guidelines-based sentences because a different conclusion would
empower courts to impose sentences contemplated by neither the government
nor the defendant:
Although district courts ordinarily have significant discretion in
determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a particular
defendant, under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) it is the parties' agreement that
determines the sentence to be imposed. To be sure, the court "retains
absolute discretion whether to accept a plea agreement," but once it
does it is bound at sentencing to give effect to the parties' agreement
as to the appropriate term of imprisonment.
Allowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply
because the court itself considered the Guidelines in deciding whether
to accept the agreement would transform § 3582(c)(2) into a
mechanism by which courts could rewrite the terms of (C) agreements
in ways not contemplated by the parties.
Id. at 2696 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
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the defendant actually enters his guilty plea. 115 Instead, plea
agreements are properly viewed as bilateral arrangements involving
16
three parties: the prosecution, the defendant, and the court.1
It is well understood that an enforceable contract requires an
offer, an acceptance, and consideration. 11 7 And while it is true that
the prosecution and the defendant negotiate the terms of the
agreement that may ultimately form the basis for the resolution of
the underlying litigation, that does not render the written product of
those negotiations (i.e., the plea agreement) an enforceable
document. 118
In fact, absent judicial assent, a plea agreement is devoid of
legal significance. 119 To see this, consider the following. In the
federal system, a defendant who wishes to enter a guilty plea must
present himself to the court and formally change his plea from not
guilty (which he entered at his arraignment) to guilty. 120 However,

115. Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1980)
("[P]lea agreements are often likened to unilateral contracts-consideration is
not given for the prosecutor's promise until the defendant actually enters his
plea of guilty."); Denton v. Martel, No. 2:03-cv-02041-TMB, 2008 WL 5101349,
at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2008) ("In the usual plea agreement, the consideration
given for the prosecutor's promise is not a corresponding promise on the part of
the defendant, but the defendant's actual performance by pleading guilty. The
agreement is therefore in the nature of a unilateral contact." (citations
omitted)); State v. King, 721 S.E.2d 327, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) ("Normally,
plea agreements are in the form of unilateral contracts and the 'consideration
given for the prosecutor's promise is not defendant's corresponding promise to
plead guilty, but rather is defendant's actual performance by so pleading."');
Sarah Baumgartel, NonprosecutionAgreements as Contracts: Stolt-Nielson and

the Question of Remedy for a Prosecutor's Breach, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 25, 38-39
(2008) ("As with plea agreements, nonprosecution and cooperation agreements
are best categorized as unilateral contracts, meaning the prosecutor exchanges
a promise of leniency for some performance from the company, and the parties
are bound only at the point the company performs, either by pleading guilty or
by cooperating."). For additional citations, see Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard!

The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroadingof CriminalDefendants,
75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 879-80 nn.79-80 (2004).
116. Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining,75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 773
(2001) ("[T]he court is the party that accepts the offer, which comes from both
the prosecutor and the defendant.").
117. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 384 F. App'x 815, 819 (10th Cir.
2010); Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
118. Constitutional safeguards necessarily prohibit strict adherence to
contract law principles in the plea agreement context. McKeever v. Warden
SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is important to remember
that plea agreements are 'constitutional contracts' and unlike contracts in other
spheres must 'be construed in light of the rights and obligations created by the
Constitution."').
119. In rare instances, a plea agreement that has not been judicially
accepted may yet be enforced if the defendant can demonstrate that he
detrimentally relied upon the prosecutor's promise. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 504, 509-10 (1984).
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b).
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before a guilty plea may be deemed valid, a court must be satisfied
121
that the plea was entered voluntarily (i.e., free of undue coercion),
knowingly (with sufficient awareness of the constitutional rights he
will forgo and the accompanying sentencing consequences), 122 and
with a sufficient factual basis to support the plea. 123 If these
prerequisites are satisfied, then the court may formally accept a
defendant's change of plea. 124 This acceptance, however, is distinct
from the court's acceptance of the plea agreement, which typically
occurs several weeks later at the time of sentencing.
On the one hand, it is true that, in the typical case, once the
defendant changes his plea and that plea is accepted by the court,
the defendant has fully performed pursuant to the agreement. After
all, the typical plea bargain calls upon the defendant to perform a
singular act-to formally change his plea. 125 It is also true, at such
a moment, that the prosecution may not withdraw from the
agreement, and the defendant may only withdraw if he can present
a fair and just reason. 126 Yet, in contrast to the law on unilateral
contracts, a defendant, despite his full and complete performance,
cannot demand the promises contained in the agreement. 127

121. Id. 11(b)(2).
122. Id. 11(b)(1).
123. Id. 11(b)(3).
124. Id. 11(b).
125. Of course, sometimes plea agreements might have additional clauses,
such as cooperation clauses that require a defendant to assist the government
after he has formally changed his plea. But such clauses do not impact this
analysis. As will be argued, the plea agreement proffered by the prosecution
and the defendant is, subject to a detrimental reliance exception, without
significance until the court formally accepts the agreement. Thus, no matter
how much the defendant performs-even if the prosecution is fully satisfied
with such performance-the enforceability of the agreement is, in almost every
circumstance, dependent upon the court's acceptance.
126. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
127. For a more detailed discussion explaining why a plea agreement fits
neither the unilateral model nor the contract subject to a condition model, see
Cook, supra note 115, at 883-99. Reproduced below is an excerpt from the
article addressing the unilateral contract contention:
With unilateral contracts, once performance is complete an acceptance
has occurred and a valid contract is formed. Thus, a promisee is
entitled to demand his promised contractual return upon satisfaction
of his performance obligation. However, in the context of plea
agreements, the courts, though adoptive of the unilateral
classification, deviate noticeably from its normative conceptions.
When a defendant enters a guilty plea and the court accepts that plea,
the court has made a determination that the defendant has fully
performed his contractual obligation. At that moment, the Rule 11
requirements have been satisfied and the defendant's performance is
complete. Indeed, there is nothing more a defendant can do but wait
for the promised return. Yet contrary to the law attendant to
unilateral contracts, a defendant, despite having fully performed, is
not entitled to demand performance under the contract. As noted,
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The critical event that determines the enforceability of a plea
agreement is whether or not the court formally accepts the proposed
resolution. If the agreement is rejected, neither the prosecution nor
the defendant is bound to its terms. 128 On the other hand, if the
agreement is accepted, only then does the contract become binding
upon the prosecution and the defendant. 129 Thus, the term "plea
agreement" is somewhat of a misnomer, given that any "agreement"
reached between the prosecution and the defendant is without legal
significance absent judicial acceptance.
In the prototypical bilateral arrangement, when an offer is
accepted, a binding contractual agreement is created. This model
The
exemplifies what occurs in the plea agreement context.
prosecution and the defendant are, essentially, joint offerors who
present an offer-in the form of a plea agreement-to the court
seeking its acceptance. In other words, when the prosecution and
the defendant enter into a "plea agreement," they have negotiated
nothing more than a "plea proposal." This "plea proposal," when
presented to the court, constitutes a contractual offer to resolve the
case pursuant to the terms stipulated in the joint offer. If rejected,
the document reflecting the plea proposal is devoid of enforceable
If, however, the court accepts the offer, then an
significance.
enforceable binding agreement is created. The next Subpart applies
these principles to the Freeman case.

Hyde observed that a court, after having accepted a guilty plea,
retained the discretion to defer acceptance of a plea agreement. The
Court then somewhat blithely added that should the court reject the
agreement, the defendant would then be afforded the opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea. This is akin to holding that an individual
who, in exchange for a promise to receive $100 if he crossed a bridge,
could not enforce the agreement upon crossing and could simply
return across the bridge if the promised return was not eventually
honored. Whereas a promisee under any other unilateral contract is
entitled to enforce the agreement, a criminal defendant is not. The
fact that a defendant must perform and then wait until some future
moment before learning whether he will get the promised benefit is
flatly inconsistent with the law attendant to unilateral contracts, and
it is flatly inconsistent because a plea agreement is not a unilateral
contract.
Id. at 884-85 (citing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 675, 677-78 (1997)).
128. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5) (stating that, in the event the court rejects the
plea agreement, the court must inform the defendant of its decision and afford
the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea).
129. As noted, the court's acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement
invariably occurs at sentencing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) provides that after the
sentence is imposed, "the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, and the plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral
attack."
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D.

ContractualPrinciples-Applicationto Freeman
Given that the prosecution, the defendant, and the court are all
parties to the plea agreement, the language delineated in the
agreement is necessarily instructive as to their intent.130
In
Freeman,the verbiage of the plea contract plainly evidences the use
and anticipated use of the Guidelines by the government, Freeman,
and the court in formulating Freeman's sentence.
Paragraph 11 of the agreement states the anticipated guideline
base offense level and criminal history category.131 It provides that
the parties anticipate, based upon the drug quantity identified in
paragraph 10132 (3.4 grams of crack cocaine), that Freeman's base
130. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206,
1210 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Contract terms are to be given their ordinary meaning,

and when the terms of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be
ascertained from the contract itself."); Burchick Constr. Co. v. United States, 83
Fed. Cl. 12, 17 (Fed. Cl. 2008) ("We give the words of the agreement their
ordinary meaning unless the parties mutually intended and agreed to an
alternative meaning." (quoting Jowett, Inc. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1365,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
131. Paragraph 11 of the Freeman plea agreement provides:
11. Both parties have independently reviewed the Sentencing
Guidelines applicable in this case, and in their best judgment and
belief, conclude as follows:
A. The Applicable Offense Level should be determined as follows:
Base offense level:
22
USSG § 2D1.1 (drug
quantity table)
-3
USSG § 3El.1(a) & (b)
Adjusted offense
19
level
B. The Criminal History of defendant shall be determined upon
completion of the presentence investigation, pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P.32(c) [sic]. Both parties reserve the right to object to the
USSG [sic] §4A1.1 calculation of defendant's criminal
history.... The parties anticipate a Criminal History Category of

IV.

C. The foregoing statements of applicability of sections of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the statement of facts are not binding
upon the Court. The defendant understands the Court will
independently calculate the Guidelines at sentencing and
defendant may not withdraw the plea of guilty solely because the
Court does not agree with either the statement of facts or
Sentencing Guideline application.
Joint Appendix at 27a-28a, Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685
(2011) (No. 09-10245), 2010 WL 4928891, at *27a-28a.
132. Paragraph 10 of the Freemanplea agreement reads, in pertinent part:
At the time of sentencing, the United States will
-recommend a fine at the lowest end of the applicable Guideline
Range, to be due and payable on the date of sentencing.
-recommend a reduction of 3 levels below the otherwise
applicable Guideline for "acceptance of responsibility" as provided
by §3El.l(a) and (b), provided the defendant does not engage in
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offense level would be twenty-two.1 33 Paragraphs 10 and 11 also
reference an anticipated three-level reduction in the base offense
level for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an overall offense
believe
level of nineteen.13 4 Paragraph 11 states that the parties
135
that Freeman will have a criminal history category of IV.

That same paragraph also explicitly states the parties'
understanding that Freeman would receive a sixty-month sentence
for the firearm offense that would run consecutive to the sentence
When the sixty-months is
imposed for the crack cocaine. 13 6
combined with the low end of the guideline range then applicable to
an offense level nineteen, criminal history category IV (forty-six
months), you arrive at the 106-month figure. Paragraph 11 further
states that "the Court will independently calculate the Guidelines at
sentencing."137 This fact is reiterated in paragraph 12, which
provides that Freeman "agrees to have his sentence determined
138
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines."'
This straightforward application of contract law provides a
clear, firm foundation upon which to adjudicate not only the issue
presented in Freeman but also any other factual construct where the
propriety of a § 3582(c)(2) request is presented. In Freeman, the
plea agreement was replete with language referencing the
Guidelines and their consideration in the calculus of the binding
sentencing term. And I suspect that the overwhelming majority of
cases will fit the Freeman prototype. But even in those rare
instances where an agreement is negotiated independent of
guideline considerations, contract law, when appropriately
considered and applied, can decipher this intent and provide a firm
basis upon which to resolve any such disputes.

future conduct which violates a condition of bond, constitutes
obstruction of justice, or otherwise demonstrates a lack of
acceptance of responsibility. Should such conduct occur and the
United States, therefore, opposes the reduction for acceptance,
this plea agreement remains binding and the defendant will not
be allowed to withdraw his plea.
-stipulate that the quantity of drugs involved in this case is 3.4
grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base and 1.6
grams of marijuana.
-agree that a sentence of 106 months' incarceration is the
appropriate disposition of this case.
Id. at 25a-26a.
133. Id. at 27a.
134. Id. at 26a-27a.
135. Id. at 28a.
136. Id. at 27a.
137. Id. at 28a.
138. Id.
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III. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR'S PREEMPTIVE WAIVER CLAUSE
SUGGESTION AND THE REAL WORLD CONSEQUENCES

Justice Sotomayor stated, in dicta, that federal prosecutors
intent on securing fixed sentencing terms can achieve this end
through a simple maneuver: the inclusion of waiver clauses in plea
agreements precluding future attempts at reductions pursuant to §
3582(c)(2). 139
As she correctly observed, federal prosecutors
regularly incorporate in their plea agreements waiver provisions in
regards to a defendant's appellate rights (direct appeal and
collateral).140

As noted, Justice Kennedy suggested that retroactive
application of guideline amendments is an infrequent occurrence. 141
If true, then adoption by the Department of Justice of Sotomayor's
proposed remedy, should it occur, would be of little consequence.
Contrary to his claim, however, the Commission adopts retroactive
amendments with some regularity. Since the Guidelines took effect
in 1987, the Commission has implemented at least twenty
retroactive amendments and has imposed reforms (sometimes quite
significant) that have impacted an array of narcotic and nonnarcotic
activity.142

Should the Department of Justice heed Sotomayor's suggestion,
not only will a large class of criminal defendants be deprived of the
ability to take advantage of the Commission's sentencing
modifications, but the objective underlying the Guidelines-the
achievement of greater equity in sentencing-will be noticeably
undermined. Given the potential applicability of such a policy to
binding and nonbinding pleas, future attempts by the Commission
to extend equitable reforms to those already convicted could be
largely preempted.
The ability (and incentive) of the defense community to mount
meaningful resistance to Department of Justice efforts to broadly
incorporate § 3582(c)(2) waivers is virtually nil. Aside from the
obvious bargaining advantages possessed by federal prosecutors, the
defense bar already lost the constitutionality battle over the
appellate waiver provisions, which are now standard fare in a great
many, if not most, federal plea agreements.1 4 3 And the stakes
139. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2699 (Sotomayor, J.,
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2693 (plurality opinion).
142. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
143. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219,
be a rare and unusual situation when claims of

concurring).

1B1.10(c) (2011).
248 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[I]t will
an unreasonable sentence,

standing alone, will be sufficient to invalidate a waiver because of a miscarriage
of justice." (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d
234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008))); United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir.
2010) (deciding not to enforce the defendant's appellate waiver); United States
v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 182 (1st Cir. 2007) ("This court, following suit, will
enforce knowing and voluntary waivers by defendants in plea agreements of
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attendant to a forfeiture of rights in this circumstance are no
greater than those in the appellate and collateral rights context.
been
Moreover, the use of § 3582(c)(2) waiver provisions has already
144
tried and upheld in at least one circuit (the Tenth Circuit).
It is well settled that a defendant is empowered to waive certain
constitutional protections (e.g., the Sixth Amendment right to trial
and to counsel) and statutory rights (e.g., the right to appeal) as part
of a negotiated settlement. 145 And there is little doubt that future
courts, when asked to decide upon the constitutionality of §
3582(c)(2) waivers, will readily conclude-as did the Tenth Circuitthat such statutory forfeitures are analogous to appellate waivers
and are valid provided they were made knowingly and
voluntarily. 146 Yet the waiver of a § 3582(c)(2) right is troubling
given that its forfeiture impacts not only individual interests but
also undercuts public policy. As noted, the laudable objective
underlying the Guidelines is the attainment of greater equity in
sentencing, and § 3582(c)(2) is a mechanism through which those
147
previously convicted can benefit from the Commission's reforms.
However, judicial sanction of such waivers would effectively
empower federal prosecutors with the authority to undercut such
legislative objectives by fiat.
This disconcerting public policy reality is matched, if not
exceeded, by the meaningful real life consequences that such
waivers could have upon convicted individuals who were sentenced
Consider the
pursuant to inequitable guideline procedures.
following three examples. The first involves a guideline amendment
for a nonnarcotics offense, while the latter two amendments affect
guideline sentencing for narcotics crimes.
Career Offender Amendment
In 1991, the Commission amended the commentary to section
4B1.2, which defines the terms used in the "Career Offender" section

A.

(section 4B1.1). 14 8 In short, section 4B1.1 addresses sentencing for

their rights to appeal, except when it would work a miscarriage of justice.");
United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Under the
express terms of his plea agreement, Rodriguez has, therefore, waived his right
to appeal his sentence.").
144. United States v. Rivers, No. 11-3100, 2012 WL 3667450, at *1 (10th Cir.
Aug. 28, 2012) ('The agreement also waived Rivers's right to bring 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) sentence-reduction motions."); United States v. Maldonado-Ortega,
No. 12-3097, 2012 WL 2129397, at *2 (10th Cir. June 13, 2012) (granting the
"government's motion to enforce the appeal waiver"); United States v. Frierson,
413 F. App'x 83, 85 (10th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (upholding the defendant's
waiver of right to pursue § 3582(c)(2) relief).
145. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-01 (1995).
146. Frierson,413 F. App'x. at 85.
147. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2694-95 (2011).
148. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 433 (2011).
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individuals classified as "career offenders" and provides for
enhanced penalties for individuals who are convicted of either a
"crime of violence" or a "controlled substance offense" and have
at
least two prior offenses that fall within either of the aforementioned
classifications.14 9 Among other changes, the amended commentary
addressed an issue that had split the circuit courts, namely, whether
the crime of felon in possession of a firearm 150 constitutes a "crime of
violence" for purposes of determining whether an individual should
be sentenced as a "career offender."'151 The amendment answered
this question in the negative.
The retroactive application of this amendment was at issue in
United States v. Beckley. 152 There the defendant entered a guilty
plea to a felon in possession of a firearm charge and was sentenced
to a term of 300 months after the court determined that he was a
career offender. 153 His plea and sentence were entered prior to the
1991 amendment. 54 After the amendment (which, as noted,
excluded the crime of felon in possession of a firearm from the crime
of violence definition), the defendant moved the district court for a
sentence modification pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). 155 The district court
rejected his request. 156 However, on appeal the Sixth Circuit
reversed, concluding that the defendant was entitled to retroactive
relief and, thus, a reduced sentence. 157 The defendant was
ultimately resentenced to a term of 190 months. 158
B.

LSD Weight DeterminationAmendment
Also, in 1993, the Commission issued Amendment 488, which
altered the method by which district courts calculated the weight
attributable to offenses involving LSD.159 Prior to the amendment,
district courts included not only the weight of the narcotic in
determining the appropriate base offense level but also the weight of
149. Id. § 4B1.1.

150. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006).
151. Id. § 924(e). This section requires the imposition of a minimum fifteenyear sentencing term of imprisonment for recidivists convicted of unlawful
possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Section 924(e) applies only to
those defendants who have three prior state or federal convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses.
152. 30 F.3d 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. ("In view of the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling that
amendments to the Guidelines and their amended commentary are binding on
the federal courts, we conclude that the district court has no discretion in this
matter, but must apply the Amendment 433 retroactively to the defendant's
sentence." (citations omitted)).
158. United States v. Beckley, 57 F.3d 1070, 1070 (6th Cir. 1995).
159. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 488 (2011).
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the carrier medium. 160 As an explanation for the change, the
Commission set forth the following explanation in its amended
commentary to section 2D1.1:
Because the weights of LSD carrier media vary widely and
typically far exceed the weight of the controlled substance
itself, the Commission has determined that basing offense
levels on the entire weight of the LSD and carrier medium
would produce unwarranted disparity among offenses
involving the same quantity of actual LSD (but different
carrier weights), as well as sentences disproportionate to those
for other, more dangerous controlled substances, such as PCP.
Consequently, in cases involving LSD contained in a carrier
medium, the Commission has established a weight per dose of
0.4 milligram for purposes of determining the base offense
level.161
1 62
Amendment 488 was at issue in United States v. Coohey.
There, the defendant was convicted and, in 1992, sentenced on a
trafficking charge involving LSD.163 The court imposed a sentence
of 298 months, based, in part, upon its conclusion that the 5950
dosages of LSD attributable to the defendant weighed 38.675
grams. 164 Subsequent to the enactment of Amendment 488, the
Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to consider whether the
defendant might be eligible for retroactive modification of his
sentence. 16 5 The Eighth Circuit commented:

After Coohey was sentenced by the District Court, the
Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines
provision that specifies the method for determining the weight
of LSD for sentencing purposes. Effective November 1, 1993,
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1993) now provides that the weight
of LSD for sentencing purposes is to be determined by treating
each dose of LSD as weighing 0.4 milligrams. Applying this
provision, the weight of LSD for which Coohey is responsible
for sentencing purposes would be 2.38 grams, rather than
34.675 grams. This lower weight would make him eligible for
a shorterprison term.166
The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether the defendant's sentence should be reduced. 167

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
11 F.3d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 101.

166. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
167. Id.
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MarijuanaEquivalency Amendment

In 1995, the Commission issued Amendment 516, which
adjusted the equivalencies between marijuana plants and the
weight of marijuana that should be attributed to each plant. 168 The
Guidelines had previously equated offenses involving fifty or more
marijuana plants as equivalent to one kilogram of marijuana. 169 For
offenses involving fewer than fifty plants, each plant was treated as
the equivalent of 100 grams of marijuana. 17
Amendment 516
discarded the one-plant-to-one-kilogram equivalency and treated
each plant, irrespective of quantity, as corresponding to 100 grams
of marijuana. 171 The Commission adopted the amendment after it
determined that "a marihuana [sic] plant does not produce a yield of
one kilogram of marihuana [sic] ."172
In 2007, United States v. Gilliam173 addressed the propriety of a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion based upon Amendment 516.174 There, the
defendant had been convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy with intent to
distribute marijuana and, when sentenced, had an applicable
guideline range of 360 months to life. 175 As a result of the
amendment, the defendant's guideline range was lowered to 262 to
327 months. 176 Ultimately, the district court granted the motion
and imposed a reduced sentence of 295 months. 177 In support, the
court found "that the reasons provided by the United States
Sentencing Commission for Amendment 516 are compelling and
require a reduction to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
178
of similar conduct.."
The amendments and cases highlighted above reflect the reallife consequences associated with retroactive amendments issued by
the Commission. As noted, the Commission has, on numerous
occasions, amended the Guidelines and extended its sentencing
adjustments to those already convicted. However, the Commission's
authority to extend relief in this fashion could be significantly
eroded should a § 3582(c)(2) waiver policy be adopted on a broad
scale.
History suggests that this is not a far-fetched possibility.
Remember, the government in Freeman sought to exclude an entire
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
2008).
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 516 (2011).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
513 F. Supp. 2d 594 (W.D. Va. 2007), aff'd, 275 F. App'x 214 (4th Cir.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

596-97.
595, 598.
598.
598-99.
598.
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class of convicted criminals-individuals convicted pursuant to a
type C plea agreement-from taking advantage of Amendment 706,
which alleviated the sentencing disparity between offenses involving
crack and powder cocaine. 179 In addition, the government has
attempted to foreclose § 3582(c)(2) relief in a number of circuits by
arguing that the appellate waiver clauses in the subject plea
agreements precluded such motions.18 0 Finally, as noted earlier in
this Part, at least one circuit has already upheld the government's
use in plea agreements of § 3582(c)(2) waivers.18 1
CONCLUSION
Whether Freeman's legacy remains in the shadow of many of
the Court's recently decided, higher-profiled criminal procedure
cases is still an open jury question. The outcome will depend upon
whether the Department of Justice adopts a policy incorporating §
3582(c)(2) waivers into federal plea agreements and whether such a
policy is limited or broad in its implementation. In the meantime,
as the Commission continues its practice of guideline review and
revision, this author hopes that the illuminated real world and
contractual realities of the plea bargaining process detailed in this
Article will inform the courts as they consider § 3582(c)(2) petitions
in the upcoming years. Even if adopted, however, the significance of
these lessons and the § 3582(c)(2) review process will be largely
mooted should the Department adopt a sweeping waiver policy.
Only time will tell what reality will emerge.

179. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2693-94 (2011); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 706 (2011); see supra notes 7-

14 and accompanying text (discussing various amendments to the U.S.
Sentencing Commission Guidelines).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Scallon, 683 F.3d 680, 682-83 (5th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552, 555-58 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1171-73 (10th Cir. 2003).
181.

See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.

